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I. INTRODUCTION
As of the writing of this note, billions of dollars in potential pay-
outs are turning on a single question: Does the Federal Extender
statute preempt state statutes of repose? If the answer is yes, Wall
* 2016 J.D. candidate, Duquesne University School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Professor Steven Baicker-McKee for his unerring guidance and mentorship through-
out the entire writing process. All errors and opinions are the author's own.
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Street banks accused of swindling buyers of mortgage-backed secu-
rities will be forced to stay in court and defend those allegations. If
the answer is no, that is, if the state statute of repose applies to the
claims, the cases will be deemed untimely; those Wall Street banks
can close the proverbial books on the allegations and put the disas-
trous years of the financial crisis behind them.
Although simple on its face, the question implicates foundational
principles of the American legal system: that legal rights can be en-
forced against those who would seek to take that which lawfully
belongs to another, that a person is entitled to his day in court, and
that where there is a right there must be a remedy. These lofty
aims are, however, often tempered by stark reality. In some cases-
regardless of the diligence with which he may have pursued his
rights-a plaintiff will find this social contract cannot always be
fulfilled. An unhappy surprise awaits the litigant who files his com-
plaint within the statute of limitations, only to find that his claim
has already been extinguished by a statute of repose.1 This plaintiff
will be told that he has no recourse, that he no longer has a right to
sue to recover what is his, and further, that the right was lost before
he even suffered the harm. How could this be? This plaintiff has
encountered that "'unyielding and absolute barrier' to a cause of ac-
tion": the statute of repose.2
As Judge Posner has noted, "[a] statute of repose is strong medi-
cine, precluding as it does even meritorious suits because of delay
for which the plaintiff is not responsible."3 A simple shift in per-
spective, however, reveals the purpose of such a seemingly unjust
rule: a statute of repose is not intended to harm the plaintiff, but
rather is purposefully designed to protect the defendant.4 The stat-
ute reflects a legislative decision that-at some point in time-a de-
fendant should have peace, that he should be able to put past events
behind him, and that he should be free to move on with his personal
and business affairs.5
1. "A statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant
acted (such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the
plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury." Statute of Repose, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th
ed. 2009).
2. McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011).
3. Id.
4. See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014) (citation omitted) ("Stat-
utes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should 'be free from liability
after the legislatively determined period of time."').
5. Id.
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Although statutes of repose are not a new concept,6 a recent
United States Supreme Court decision7 ignited new debates about
the powerful and dispositive role these statutes can play to extin-
guish plaintiffs' claims in many areas of litigation, including ongo-
ing toxic tort claims,8 claims filed under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 9 and-as explored in this note-claims filed by government
agencies to recoup billions of dollars lost during the 2008 mortgage-
backed securities crisis.
In CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,1 0 the United States Supreme Court
held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")1 1 does not preempt state
statutes of repose. The reverberations of that ruling run deep-so
deep, in fact, that the Court's statutory analysis impacts the trajec-
tory of litigation for three separate government entities: the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"); the National Credit Union
Administration Board ("NCUA"); and the Federal Housing Finance
Agency ("FHFA"). In the wake of Waldburger, these agencies have
been forced to fend off numerous defendants seeking to show that-
6. See Adam Bain, Determining the Preemptive Effect of Federal Law on State Statutes
of Repose, 43 U. BALTIMORE L. REV. 119, 128 (2014) (explaining that many state legisla-
tures-at the urging of insurance companies-enacted statutes of repose in the latter half of
the twentieth century, and that statutes of repose were a direct response to advancements in
tort law that dictated the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovered (or "accrued") the harm).
7. See generally CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).
8. See, e.g., Stahle v. CTS Corp., No. 1:14-CV-00048-MOC-DL, 2014 WL 6879393
(W.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2014) ("While nothing would please this court more than to have a jury
decide whether this plaintiffs serious illness was caused by exposure to chemicals allegedly
dumped on to the land . . . by this defendant, to do so would require the court to ignore
[precedent].")
9. See, e.g., Bryant v. United States, 768 F.3d 1378 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 71 (2015) (applying Waldburger in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680, and holding that North Carolina's statute of repose could apply to extinguish
claims made by thousands of Marines that they had been exposed to toxic drinking water
while stationed at Camp Lejune).
10. 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
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like CERCLA's section 9658-the so-called "Federal Extender" stat-
ute1 2 does not preempt state statutes of repose.13
A general trend has emerged. Federal district courts are consist-
ently holding that the FDIC Extender Statute-like CERCLA's sec-
tion 9658-is solely a statute of limitations, and is not a statute of
repose.14 The NCUA and FHFA Extender Statutes, on the other
12. The term "Extender" statute is a semi-generic term used by courts to describe the
time limitations under which these entities must bring their claims under certain chapters
of Title 12 in the U.S. Code. For purposes of this note, "Federal Extender" or "Extender"
statute will collectively describe the text of the FDIC Extender statute, 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(14)(A), the NCUA Extender statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14), and the FHFA Extender
statute, 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(12)(A). The text of all three statutes is materially the same. The
text of the FDIC Extender statute reads as follows:
Statute of limitations for actions brought by conservator or receiver
(A) In general. Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute
of limitations with regard to any action brought by the Corporation as conservator or
receiver shall be- (i) in the case of any contract claim, the longer of-- (I) the 6-year
period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State
law; and (ii) in the case of any tort claim (other than a claim which is subject to section
1441a(b)(14) of this title), the longer of (I) the 3-year period beginning on the date the
claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law. (B) Determination of the
date on which a claim accrues.
For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitations begins to
run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of-- (i) the date of the
appointment of the Corporation as conservator or receiver; or (ii) the date on which the
cause of action accrues.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(14)(A).
13. See, e.g., NCUA v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2014)
("Nomura II") (decided Aug. 19, 2014) (challenging the applicability of Waldburger type stat-
utory analysis as applied to the NCUA Extender Statute); FDIC v. Chase Mortgage Fin.
Corp., 42 F. Supp. 3d 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (challenging the applicability of Waldburger type
statutory analysis as applied to the FDIC Extender Statute); FHFA v. HSBC N. Am. Hold-
ings Inc., No. 11CV6189 DLC, 2014 WL 4276420 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014) (challenging Wald-
burger analysis as applied to the FHFA Extender Statute).
14. See e.g., Chase, 42 F. Supp. 3d 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); FDIC v. Jones, No. 2:13-CV-
168-JAD-GWF, 2014 WL 4699511 (D. Nev. Sept. 19, 2014); Cf. FDIC v. Bear Stearns Asset
Backed Sec. I LLC, 92 F. Supp. 3d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding Extender statute does not
preempt federal statute of repose); But see FDIC v. Williams, No. 2:13-CV-00883, 2014 WL
5073605 (D. Utah Oct. 8, 2014) (not mentioning whether the Extender statute is one of limi-
tations or repose); FDIC v. Rhodes, 336 P.3d 961, 968 (Nev. 2014) (declining to label the
statute as either one of limitations or repose, but holding that-regardless of the label-the
FDIC extender statute's time limitation "expressly preempts any shorter state statutory time
limitation," including Nevada's). In August 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas also held that the FDIC Extender statute did not preempt state statutes of
repose, but-citing to multiple pre- Waldburger cases and the Nevada Supreme Court's
Rhodes opinion-the Fifth Circuit recently reversed and remanded. See FDIC v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., No. A-14-CA-129-SS, 2014 WL 4161567 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2014), rev'd sub
nom. FDIC v. RBS Sec. Inc., 798 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015); FDIC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc., No. A-14-CA-126-SS, 2014 WL 4161561 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2014),
rev'd sub nom. FDIC v. RBS Sec. Inc., 798 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015); see also Nate Raymond,
US Banking Regulator Wins Revival of Mortgage Bond Lawsuits, REUTERS, Aug. 10, 2015,
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hand, are consistently held to be both statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose.15
Much turns on this distinction; the decision could mean the dif-
ference between dismissal and years of protracted litigation result-
ing in potential billion dollar payouts.16 At its most basic, this par-
ticular disparity means that the FDIC's opponents-such as large
Wall Street banks and small retail bank officers-can usually win
their motions for dismissal on pure time preclusion grounds,17 while
the NCUA and FHFA opponents-ironically, those same Wall
Street banks against whom the FDIC is litigating-must defend on
the merits.18 The most startling aspect of these polar opposite stat-
utory interpretations is this: the text of all three statutes is essen-
tially identical.19
Banks and bankers-those favorite defendants of the govern-
ment since the 2008 mortgage-backed securities crisiS20-see the
agencies' vulnerability in the situation. Sensing confusion and an
opportunity, the bankers ask a reasonable question: if the golden
rule of statutory interpretation is to apply the plain meaning of the
text, how can it be that the same text is a statute of repose in one
statute, but not the other?21
http://www.reuters.com/article/mbs-lawsuit-idUSL1N1OL2HQ20150810. As of the writing of
this article, a response on the banks' petition for certiorari is pending.
15. See e.g., Nomura II, 764 F.3d 1199; NCUA v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 13CV6705
DLC, 2014 WL 5017822 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014); HSBC, 2014 WL 4276420; FHFA v. Royal
Bank of Scot. Group PLC, No. 3:11CV1383 (AWT), 2015 WL 4999912 (D. Conn. Aug. 21,
2015).
16. See, e.g., Devlin Barrett & Dan FitzPatrick, J.P. Morgan, U.S. Settle for $13 Billion,
WALL ST. J., (Nov. 19, 2013, 6:05 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052702304439804579207701974094982 (detailing a landmark settlement entered into
by J.P. Morgan before Waldburger was decided, and explaining, that, of J.P. Morgan's "$13
billion settlement ... the bank will pay ... $1.4 billion to settle federal and state claims by the
National Credit Union Administration, $515 million to settle Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. claims, [and] $4 billion to settle Federal Housing Finance Agency claims. . . .")
17. The existence of a tolling agreement complicates matters, as will be discussed later
in this note. For cases dismissing FDIC claims because the state statute of repose was not
pre-empted, see cases cited supra note 14.
18. See cases cited supra note 15.
19. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A), with 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14), and with 12 U.S.C.
§ 4617(b)(12)(A).
20. The roots and history of the mortgage-backed securities crisis are beyond the scope
of this note, however, for a brief overview, see The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash
Course, THE ECONOMIST, (Sept 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/
21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article [hereinafter Crash
Course].
21. The disparity has been quite pronounced amongst judges in the Southern District of
New York. Compare HSBC, 2014 WL 4276420 (Judge Cote holding on August 28, 2014 that
the Extender statute does preempt state statutes of repose), with Chase, 42 F. Supp. 3d 574,
579 (Judge Stanton holding a week later that it does not), and with Morgan Stanley & Co.,
2014 WL 5017822 (Judge Cote reaffirming later that month that it does); see also Bear
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This note will examine that question in light of the impact Wald-
burger has had on the efforts of the FDIC, the NCUA, and the FHFA
to recover billions of dollars from Wall Street banks and retail bank-
ers, all of which was lost during the 2008 financial crisis. This note
will then discuss the arguments raised by the Waldburger majority
and dissent, and will apply that logic to the Federal Extender stat-
ute in context of the Court's previous interpretation of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA") set forth in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC. 2 2
Finally, this note will conclude by advocating that Congress take
immediate action to resolve what has become an untenable rift in
the statutory interpretation of the Federal Extender Statute. In
light of Waldburger's divisive impact on judicial interpretation of
the Federal Extender statute, Congress must revisit the text of the
Extender statute and enact new language clarifying whether it in-
tended to preempt state statutes of repose. Barring Congressional
action, both Waldburger and O'Melveny & Myers dictate that fed-
eral courts must take a stringent approach to interpreting the Ex-
tender statute. Accordingly, the federal judiciary must find that
the Extender statute does not preempt state statutes of repose.23
II. BACKGROUND
A) The 2008 Financial Crisis
In the months and years following the 2008 mortgage-backed se-
curities crisis, Wall Street and the federal government began to tri-
age and tally up their losses.24 Lehman Brothers & Bear Stearns
had collapsed, more than 500 retail banks-including IndyMac and
Washington Mutual-had failed, and more than 8.8 million jobs
had been lost.2 5 Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been taken
Stearns, 92 F. Supp. 3d 206 (Judge Swain holding on March 24, 2015 that the Extender stat-
ute does not preempt federal statutes of repose, as found in Section 13 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77m).
22. 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
23. Although a discussion of preemption of federal statutes of repose is beyond the scope
of this article, the reader will find that many of the cases cited infra also include a discussion
on that topic.
24. See generally Crash Course, supra note 20 (explaining fall out from mortgage-backed
securities crisis).
25. See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS RESPONSE, IN CHARTS (April
2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Documents/20120413_Fi-
nancialCrisisResponse.pdf (explaining the impact of bank failures on the economy); see also
FDIC, FDIC FAILED BANK LIST, https://www.fdic.gov/banklindividual/failed/banklist.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (showing 510 retail banks failed between 2007 and 2014).
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under conservatorship in the newly formed Federal Housing Fi-
nance Administration,26 and the National Credit Union Admin-
istration was dealing with the failure of both corporate and con-
sumer credit unions across the country.27 In total, $19.2 trillion
dollars in household wealth had been destroyed.28 In an unprece-
dented step in the era of modern banking, the task fell to the federal
government to step in and prop up the United States economy.
Three government agencies emerged as the overseers of that ef-
fort: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation stepped into the
shoes of the 500+ failed retail banks; the Federal Housing Finance
Authority assumed control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both of
which are Government Sponsored Entities originally tasked with
ensuring liquidity and interest rate stabilization in the mortgage
market); and-in addition to taking a number of small consumer
credit unions into conservatorship-the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration assumed conservatorship of five failed corporate credit
unions, each of whom had contributed to losses in the billions of
dollars due to failed bets on mortgage-backed securities.29 The im-
mediate need was of course, to stabilize the organizations and pre-
vent further loss of assets. But, soon each agency's search for cul-
pable parties began.
Although an in-depth discussion of the 2008 financial crisis is be-
yond the scope of this article, a brief digression may help to illus-
trate the players and the stakes. The nature of the mortgage-
backed securities meltdown has been likened to a massive Ponzi
scheme.30 One might think of it as a machine: there are the raw
26. The Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and Federal Home Loan
Service Corporation ("Freddie Mac") are Government-Sponsored Enterprises ("GSE's") that
have historically been tasked with bringing liquidity and interest rate stabilization to the
mortgage market, thereby letting more people finance the purchase of a home. See FEDERAL
HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, HISTORY OF THE
GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, http://fhfaoig.gov/LearnMore/History (last visited
Apr. 19, 2015).
27. See GAO, NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION: EARLIER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED
TO BETTER ADDRESS TROUBLED CREDIT UNIONS (Jan. 2012), http://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/590/587410.pdf (explaining that 5 corporate credit unions and 85 consumer credit unions
failed between January 1 2008 and June 30, 2011, and that corporate credit unions lost bil-
lions of dollars by investing in mortgage-backed securities that they presumably thought
were high quality assets).
28. The Financial Crisis Response, supra note 25, chart 1.
29. See supra notes 20, 24-28 and accompanying text for a brief history on the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis.
30. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 158 (2010);
Charles Ferguson, Heist of the Century: Wall Street's Role in the Financial Crisis, THE
GUARDIAN, May 20, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/may/20/wall-street-




materials, (John and Jane Homeowner's desire for cash or a house),
which are fed into the engine (the Subprime Mortgage Lender's
easy approvals, with no money down and adjustable rate mort-
gages), which are quickly processed (no documentation? you're ap-
proved!), and then sent to the packaging department (Wall Street
investment firms like Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, etc...). Next, John and Jane's individual mortgage is bun-
dled with other mortgages into a single product (a Mortgage-Backed
Security, for example), which is inspected and given a seal of ap-
proval (Investment Grade!) by the inspections department (S&P,
Moodys, etc...), and then marketed and sold by the marketing de-
partment (that same Wall Street firm or some other Securities Un-
derwriter) to the end consumer (corporate credit unions, Freddie
Mac, Fannie Mae, firefighters and policemen pension funds, munic-
ipal funds, etc...) as a high quality product that will produce a rel-
atively safe, steady stream of income.31
All works well, the engine continues to hum along and everyone
makes money, until John and Jane Homeowner are hit with their
first balloon payment and stop paying their mortgage. There is no
crisis yet, after all, there are many other mortgages-many other
streams of income-other than John and Janes' in the pool, but then
another homeowner defaults, and another, and another. Suddenly,
the great economic engine is no longer running but has come to a
grinding halt, with the end consumer-corporate credit unions,
Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and other investors-left holding a mas-
sive portfolio of "investment grade" securities that have been ren-
dered worthless.32
schemes/ (explaining the nature of Ponzi schemes and arguing that they are "natural phe-
nomena" occurring within the global finance markets, driven by the irrational and optimistic
expectation of investors that prices will continue to rise).
31. This description is derived from Michael Lewis' excellent book on the 2008 financial
crisis. See LEWIS, supra note 30, at 76, 90 (referring to the creation of these assets as a "new
money machine" and a "subprime mortgage machine").
32. See Crash Course, supra note 20:
When America's housing market turned, a chain reaction exposed fragilities in the
financial system. Pooling and other clever financial engineering did not provide inves-
tors with the promised protection. Mortgage-backed securities slumped in value, if
they could be valued at all. Supposedly safe CDOs turned out to be worthless, despite
the ratings agencies' seal of approval. It became difficult to sell suspect assets at al-
most any price, or to use them as collateral for the short-term funding that so many
banks relied on. Fire-sale prices, in turn, instantly dented banks' capital thanks to
"mark-to-market" accounting rules, which required them to revalue their assets at cur-
rent prices and thus acknowledge losses on paper that might never actually be in-
curred.
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This chain reaction triggered the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression.33 Wall Street began to collapse, retail banks be-
gan to fail, and many Americans lost their homes.34 Against this
backdrop, the FDIC, the NCUA, and the FHFA stepped in to as-
sume control of failed retail banks, massive corporate credit unions,
Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae.3 5
B) The Agencies' Statutory Authority as Receiver or Conservator
Although the agencies obtain their authority from different fed-
eral statutes, much of the language granting their powers and
rights with regard to a distressed institution is essentially the
same.36 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), the Federal Credit Union Act
("FCUA"), and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
("HERA") grant authority to the FDIC, the NCUA, and the FHFA
to act as a receiver or conservator for the institutions for which each
agency is responsible.37 The FDIC "steps into the shoes" of dis-
tressed or failed retail banks, the NCUA "steps into the shoes" of
distressed or failed corporate and consumer credit unions, and the
FHFA "steps into the shoes" of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both
of which have been distressed since 2008).38
When acting as a receiver or conservator, the agency can "sue and
be sued" as though it is the institution itself.39 Notably, when one
of these three government agencies acts as a receiver or conservator
of the distressed institution, it "immediately succeeds to all rights
33. See Tim Worstall, Ben Bernanke: The 2008 Financial Crisis was Worse than the Great
Depression, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timwor-
stall/2014/08/27/ben-bernanke-the-2008-financial-crisis-was-worse-than-the-great-depres-
sion/.
34. See supra notes 20, 24-28 and accompanying text for a brief history on the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis.
35. See supra notes 20, 24-28 and accompanying text for a brief history on the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis.
36. See Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87, 93 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that
"Section 1821(d)(2)(A) & (B) of FIRREA, regarding the power and rights of conservators and
receivers, is almost identical to § 4617(b)(2)(A) & (B) of HERA").
37. See generally 12 U.S.C. §1821(d); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b); 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b) (generally
explaining powers and duties granted in capacity as receiver or conservator).
38. See Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1203 (citation omitted) (explaining that, upon taking over
as conservator, the NCUA "steps into the shoes of the credit union and succeeds to 'all rights,
titles, powers, and privileges of the credit union...."'); Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d
87, 93 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that the FDIC and the FHFA do the same with regard to
their underlying institutions).
39. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (FDIC); 12 U.S.C.§ 1766 (NCUA) (including any right to sue on
behalf of the corporation); In re Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. Derivative Litig., 643 F.
Supp. 2d 790, 797 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff'd sub nom. La. Mun. Police Emp. Ret. Sys. v. FHFA,
434 F. App'x 188 (4th Cir. 2011).
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and powers of the stockholders, officers, and directors of the regu-
lated entity," and ceases to behave as a "government actor."40 This
means that, once the agency takes the troubled institution under
conservatorship, it can also take all steps necessary to collect and
protect the institution's assets, including filing suit against those
who harmed the institution.4 1
Having seen to the immediate stabilization needs, the govern-
ment agencies focused their efforts on litigation designed to recoup
their "staggering losses."4 2 The government coffers had been exten-
sively drained: the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund lost an estimated
$83 billion dollars due to bank failures between 2008 and 2013,43
and the FHFA required an investment of $189 billion from the U.S.
Treasury to avert the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in
the days following the crisis.44 Given the number and complexity of
the issues in play, the agencies in many cases sought to execute
tolling agreements with potential defendants in order to pause the
running of the statute of limitations.4 5  The FDIC has explained
that it frequently executes tolling agreements with potential de-
fendants, and relies on those agreements to give the FDIC more
time to investigate complex issues and determine if it will actually
file a claim.46
Upon completing their investigation of the underlying issues, the
agencies eventually began to file lawsuits. The agencies focused
their cases on two types of defendants, (1) Wall Street Securities
40. Herron, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 94.
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1204.
43. See Memorandum from Diane Ellis, Director FDIC Division of Ins. and Res. to FDIC
Board of Directors (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/2014-10-02-no-
tice dis d mem.pdf.
44. FHFA, FHFA as Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, FHFA.GOV,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae--Freddie-Conserva-
torships.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2015).
45. A tolling agreement is "an agreement between a potential plaintiff and a potential
defendant by which the defendant agrees to extend the statutory limitations period on the
plaintiffs claim, usually so that both parties will have more time to resolve their dispute
without litigation." Tolling Agreement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
46. See FDIC Receivership Mgmt. Program: 2008-2013 Strategic Plan (Nov. 21, 2008),
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/receivership.html:
Each potential claim has a statute of limitations that establishes a time limit for the
claim to be filed. A substantial increase in the number of failures could make it diffi-
cult to complete investigations of all potential claims and make decisions within the
established time limit on whether to pursue a claim. The same problem could occur
with very complex investigations or claims. In such cases, the FDIC will generally seek
to enter into a tolling agreement with the potential defendant to extend the allowable
time frame for the claim to be filed.
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Underwriters and (2) Directors and Officers of retail banks.47 Al-
leging misrepresentation and fraud, the NCUA and the FHFA pri-
marily sued the Securities Underwriters-those Wall Street firms
who had published the securities prospectus and actually marketed
the product to the credit unions, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac as
relatively safe streams of investment income.4 8 The FDIC filed sim-
ilar suits for its retail banks that had been unfortunate enough to
also buy those toxic securities.4 9 In addition to its own suits against
the Wall Street firms, the FDIC also pursued another type of de-
fendant-the directors and officers of its failed retail banks that had
made the risky loans in the first place.5 0 In many cases, the agen-
cies were able to settle, and recovered substantial sums from the
banks.5 1 In 2013-14, the FHFA alone recovered more than $18 bil-
lion dollars from settlements with big Wall Street firms.52 Unfortu-
nately for these government agencies, and in spite of the fact that
they had executed tolling agreements extending the statute of lim-
itations, the time in which they could bring suit was quickly run-
ning out.
C) The Agencies Argue That the Extender Statute Grants More
Time to Sue
Upon assuming control of a failed institution, the FDIC, NCUA,
and FHFA typically have six years under the statute of limitations
to bring a contract claim, and three years under the statute of lim-
itations to bring a tort claim, assuming the institution's claim
47. See cases cited supra notes 13-15.
48. See cases cited supra note 15.
49. See cases cited supra note 14.
50. Between 2009 and 2014, the FDIC authorized professional liability suits against
1,181 Directors and Officers of failed institutions, resulting in 104 lawsuits against 793 for-
mer Directors and Officers. In addition to those suits against individuals, the FDIC further
authorized 140 suits related to residential mortgage-backed securities and mortgage fraud.
See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Professional Liability Lawsuits, FDIC.GOV,
https://www.fdic.gov/banklindividual/failed/pls/ (last visited Jan. 4th, 2015).
51. See Federal Housing Finance Administration, Private Label Securities Actions,
FHFA.GOV, http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFAs-Update-on-Private-La-




against the third party had not already lapsed by the date the in-
stitution was taken under control.53 This provision is typically re-
ferred to as the Federal Extender statute.54 Although the three
agencies' individual Extender statutes are codified in different sec-
tions of Title 12 of the U.S. Code, as mentioned, the language con-
ferring this extra grant of time is basically identical.55
While it is considered settled law that the Extender statute
preempts any shorter state statute of limitations, it has become a
hotly contested issue as to whether the Extender statute also
preempts a state statute of repose.5 6 Billions of dollars can turn on
the semantics: if the plaintiffs can convince the court that the Ex-
tender statute is both a statute of limitations and a statute of re-
pose-or as some agencies argue, a "universal time frame,"5 7 those
plaintiffs can usually fend off defendants' motions to dismiss for
lack of timeliness.58 But, if the plaintiffs fail to convince the court
that the Extender statute is the one and only timeframe controlling
their claims, then the defendants can wield the statute of repose as
a shield to ward off the plaintiffs' attack.59 If the court finds that
the state statute of repose applies, and if its time has run, then the
FDIC, the NCUA, and the FHFA's claims against their defendants
will be extinguished.60
Before delving into the arguments each side proffers to support
its view that the Extender statute does or does not preempt, it is
important to review the primary differences between statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose.
53. See statutes cited supra note 12 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the FDIC and
the FHFA Extender Statute appear to include provisions that revive dead state law claims
in certain cases, however the agencies do not appear to be citing to this provision in the cases.
See infra note 85 and accompanying text; see also NCUA v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 13
Civ. 6705(DLC), 2014 WL 241739, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) ("The NCUA Extender
Statute does not resuscitate barred claims; it merely extends the statute of limitations for
open claims by three years.").
54. See statute cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.
55. See statute cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.
56. See Alison Frankel, In MBS Litigation, NCUA is FHFA's Mini Me, REUTERS (Feb. 22,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/02/22/in-mbs-litigation-ncua-is-fhfas-
mini-me/ (explaining the numerous suits that have been filed by the corporate defendants,
and the conflicting answers courts are giving when deciding whether the Extender statute is
a statute of repose).
57. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1203.
58. See supra note 15.
59. See supra note 14.
60. Cf. McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2011).
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D) Critical Distinctions Between Statutes of Limitations and
Statutes of Repose
Although statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are simi-
lar in that they are both designed to limit the time in which a plain-
tiff may file suit, several crucial differences exist: (1) the statutes
have different triggering factors;61 (2) the statutes are intended to
serve different purposes;62 (3) statutes of limitations are procedural
in nature, while statutes of repose are substantive;63 and (4) a stat-
ute of limitations may be subject to legal and equitable tolling,
while a statute of repose is usually not.64
First, the statutes have different triggering mechanisms.65 A
statute of limitations is measured from the perspective of the plain-
tiff; the clock begins to run on a statute of limitations when the
plaintiffs claim "accrues," that is, when all elements of his cause of
action become complete.66 In some cases, a cause of action does not
accrue until the date a plaintiff knows or should know that he has
a claim; this rule is commonly referred to as the "discovery rule."6 7
So, for example, if a homeowner discovers that his well water is
contaminated with Trichloroethylene supposedly deposited many
years ago by a neighboring manufacturing plant, the statute of lim-
itations begins to run as of the date the homeowner became aware
of the contamination.6 8
A statute of repose, on the other hand, is measured from the per-
spective of the defendant.69 The statute is not triggered by the
plaintiffs discovery of the harm, but is instead triggered by some
61. See CTS v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182-84 (2014).
62. Id.
63. See Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir.
2013) (citation omitted) ("[I]n contrast to statutes of limitations, statutes of repose 'create a
substantive right in those protected to be free from liability after a legislatively-determined
period of time."').
64. See Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2182-84.
65. Id.
66. See Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S.
192, 201 (1997) (absent legislation stating otherwise, "a cause of action does not become 'com-
plete and present' for limitations purposes until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.")
67. Black's Law Dictionary defines the Discovery Rule as "[t]he rule that a limitations
period does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers (or reasonably should have discov-
ered) the injury giving rise to the claim. The discovery rule usually applies to injuries that
are inherently difficult to detect." Discovery Rule, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
68. See Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2182; Waldburger v. CTS Corp., 723 F.3d 434, 441 (4th
Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) and rev'd on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2175
(2014).
69. See Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2182-83 ("That limit is measured not from the date on
which the claim accrues but instead from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the
defendant.... [It] embodies the idea that at some point a defendant should be able to put
past events behind him.").
Winter 2016 255
Duquesne Law Review
last act or omission of the defendant.70 In the earlier example, the
statute of repose would be triggered by the last date the manufac-
turer deposited chemicals, or perhaps the last date on which the
manufacturer owned the property.71 The exact triggering factor it-
self will be defined by the state statute of repose, but the nature of
the statute of repose is that it exists independently of any harm
incurred by the plaintiff; the clock can only be triggered by the de-
fendant's acts or omissions.72
This brings us to the second crucial difference between a statute
of limitations and a statute of repose: the purpose of the statutes.
A statute of limitations is designed to ensure that a plaintiff does
not sit on his rights; a statute of repose is designed to ensure that a
defendant not be subject to perpetual liability-that he can in fact
move on and set the past behind him.7 3 Similar to "a discharge in
bankruptcy, a statute of repose can be said to provide a fresh start
or freedom from liability." 74 The Waldburger court explained that
"[s]tatutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant
should 'be free from liability after the legislatively determined pe-
riod of time."'7 5
Third, a statute of limitations is merely procedural in nature, but
a statute of repose is substantive.76 If a statute of limitations has
run, it's understood that the plaintiff had a vested claim, but the
time permitted to bring suit has simply passed.77 If a statute of
repose has run, the plaintiff either had no vested claim (because the
repose period ended before the statute of limitations began), or any
vested claim he may have had has been terminated (because the
repose period ended before he sued).78 In sum, after the statute of
70. Id.
71. See cases cited supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2182-83.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2183.
75. Id. (quoting 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 7, p. 24 (2010)).
76. See 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 29 (2015) ("Unlike a statute of limitations, a
statute of repose is not merely a limitation of a plaintiffs remedy but defines the right in-
volved in terms of the time allowed to bring suit."); Prasad v. Holder, 776 F.3d 222, 227 (4th
Cir. 2015) ("[C]onferral of a substantive right or immunity from substantive liability is the
work of a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations."). But see FHFA v. UBS Americas,
Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 306, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd, 712 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Jinks
v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 465 (2013) (noting that the "Supreme Court has rejected
defendants' argument that state statutes of limitation should be considered 'procedural' for
purposes of federalism analysis")).
77. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
78. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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repose period runs its course, the plaintiff no longer has any sub-
stantive right to enforce, thus, his cause of action has been entirely
extinguished.79
The fact that a limitations period is merely procedural, while a
repose period is substantive, drives the fourth and final major dis-
tinction: tolling. While a statute of limitations may be subject to
tolling,8 0 most courts hold that a statute of repose cannot be tolled.81
This difference is crucial for agencies like the FDIC, the NCUA,
and the FHFA. Because these agencies frequently seek to enter
into tolling agreements with potential defendants, it could be ar-
gued that this particular feature of a statute of repose poses the
greatest threat to the agencies' ability to recover from liable par-
ties.82 If a statute of repose may not be tolled, then it essentially
means that all of the tolling agreements the agencies have been en-
tering into with defendants do not provide the protection previously
thought.83 After all, what good is it to have a statute of limitations
extended, if the agency finds it is still barred by the statute of re-
pose?
Although the Waldburger Court did not address the issue of
whether a tolling agreement itself could extend a statute of repose,
the Tenth Circuit recently held that contractual tolling agreements
are ineffective against the Extender Statute.84 The court also held,
79. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
80. The Seventh Circuit has previously stated that neither equitable tolling nor equitable
estoppel apply to a statute of repose. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446,
451 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The rule in the federal courts is that both tolling doctrines-equitable
estoppel and equitable tolling-are, just like the discovery rule, grafted on to federal statutes
of limitations . . . [t]o this as to most legal generalizations, there are exceptions. Neither
tolling doctrine applies to statutes of repose.").
81. See id.; CTS v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2183 (2014) (Unlike statutes of limita-
tions, "statutes of repose ... generally may not be tolled, even in cases of extraordinary cir-
cumstances."). See also FHFA u. UBS Americas Inc., which states that:
Statutes of limitations limit the availability of remedies and, accordingly, may be sub-
ject to equitable considerations, such as tolling, or a discovery rule. In contrast, stat-
utes of repose affect the underlying right, not just the remedy, and thus they "run
without interruption once the necessary triggering event has occurred, even if equita-
ble considerations would warrant tolling or even if the plaintiff has not yet, or could
not yet have, discovered that she has a cause of action."
712 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting P. Stolz Family P'ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92,
102 (2d Cir.2004)).
82. See FDIC Receivership Mgmt. Program, supra note 46 and accompanying text. In
the event of wide-scale failures or complex investigations, the FDIC will seek to enter into
tolling agreements with potential defendants to pause the running of the statute of limita-
tions, and therefore extend the time frame in which the claim can be filed.); the NCUA and
the FHFA employ a similar strategy with regard to tolling agreements.
83. See generally FDIC Receivership Mgmt. Program supra note 46 and accompanying
text.
84. See Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Barclays Capital, Inc., 785 F.3d 387, 392 (ex-
plaining that the "notwithstanding any provision of any contract" language in the Extender
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however, that the defendant's promise to not sue on time limita-
tions grounds could be enforced through estoppel: because the de-
fendant had repeatedly promised not to assert a statute of limita-
tions defense, the court estopped the defendant from doing so, and
denied the plaintiffs motion to dismiss.85 Although the agency won
this round, the Tenth Circuit's decision casts doubt on the future
viability of the FDIC, NCUA, and FHFA's tolling agreements
within the Circuit.86 This will be an interesting trend to follow as
the case law on this issue develops.87
Having discussed the primary differences between statutes of
limitations and repose, the scene is set to examine these concepts
in the context of federal preemption.
1II. ARGUMENT
A) Two Distinct Scenarios
When addressing the question of whether the Extender statute
preempts the state statute of repose, two potential scenarios merit
attention. In the first, the statute of repose has ended before the
agency took the failed bank into receivership, but the statute of lim-
itations is still alive. In the second, both the statute of repose and
the statute of limitations are alive when the agency takes the failed
bank into receivership.
1) Scenario 1: Statute of Repose Expires Before Date of Re-
ceivership
In the first scenario, the analysis should not reach the question
of preemption, as the claim was dead before preemption could even
Statute "amounts to an express statement that the Extender Statute's limitations periods
cannot be tolled by agreement.").
85. Id. at 393; see also FDIC v. Coleman, No. 1:14-CV-00310-CWD, 2015 WL 476234
(D. Idaho Feb. 5, 2015) (unpublished). Coleman held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel
would apply to bar the defendants from arguing the tolling agreement was invalid to extend
the limitations period:
It is reasonable to infer that Defendants' promises induced the FDIC-R to delay filing
suit. Further, there is no evidence suggesting that the FDIC-R had any reason to
believe that Defendants would not honor the Tolling Agreement. Thus, the undisputed
facts before the Court establish that equitable estoppel applies and precludes Defend-
ants from asserting the FDIC-R's claims are time-barred.
Id. at *8. But see Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2183 ("a repose period is fixed and its expiration
will not be delayed by estoppel . . . .").
86. Barclays Capital, Inc., 785 F.3d at 392.
87. The Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Barclays seems to negate the effectiveness of tolling
agreements under the Dodd-Frank Act's Extender Statute too, as Dodd-Frank contains the
same "notwithstanding any provision of any contract" clause. Compare Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(10)(A), with 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(14)
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have applied. While the Extender statute can extend a viable claim,
it cannot revive a dead claim.88 The distinction is crucial with re-
gard to agencies acting in their capacity as receivers of failed insti-
tutions. Because the agencies merely "step into the shoes" of the
failed institution, they have only those rights that existed at the
time they assumed control. No new rights or powers are conferred
upon the receiver agency, and therefore the agency may only sue
and be sued on those causes of action that the failed bank itself
could have at the time.89 This, therefore, is not a question of
whether the Extender statute preempts time limits. Rather, the
proper question in this scenario is whether the failed bank-and by
proxy the receiver agency-had any right to sue at all on those
claims at the time of receivership.
The argument that a statute of repose can even be preempted
only makes sense if one assumes that the statute of limitations will
always expire before the statute of repose runs out. But, as demon-
strated by Waldburger and several other decisions, that is not al-
ways the case. Sometimes the statute of repose can expire earlier
than the statute of limitations.90 This happens when the statute of
limitations has been tolled for a period of time due to the plaintiff
having not yet discovered the harm.91 Applying that concept to the
Extender statute, it becomes clear that if the statute of repose had
run before the time the bank was taken into receivership, then the
failed bank itself could not have sued. If the failed bank itself could
not have sued at that point in time, then nor could the receiver
88. There is an exception to this general statement. The FDIC and FHFA Extender Stat-
utes specifically provide that some state law tort claims can be revived. See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(14)(C); 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(13)(A):
In the case of any tort claim described under [the Extender Statute] for which the
statute of limitations applicable under State law with respect to such claim has expired
not more than 5 years before the appointment of the Agency as conservator or receiver,
the Agency may bring an action as conservator or receiver on such claim without re-
gard to the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable under State law.
Id. Judge Cotes of the Southern District of New York has pointed out that the FHFA seems
to have forgotten to take advantage of this provision. See FHFA v. UBS Americas, Inc., No.
11 CIV. 5201 DLC, 2012 WL 2400263, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2012), where the court, in an
unpublished opinion, avoided this issue by holding that the statute of repose had started to
run as of a later date, and that therefore the federal securities claim was still viable as of the
date the FHFA had taken Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship.
89. See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 966 F. Supp. 2d 1018,
1021 (C.D. Cal. 2013) reconsideration denied, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2013) ("Under
FIRREA, it is [state] law that defines the existence and scope of the right that the FDIC
received from [the failed bank].)




agency. 92 Accordingly, under scenario one, the courts must evalu-
ate the issue on grounds other than preemption.
2) Scenario 2: Statute of Repose Expires Before Date of Suit
The second scenario, then, is truly the scenario where the
preemption analysis is proper. In this scenario, the failed bank it-
self could have sued the defendant as of the date of receivership, as
both the statute of limitations and the statute of repose were still
running. Because the failed bank had the right to sue as of that
date, so too, does the receiver agency have the right to sue when it
"steps into the shoes" of the failed bank.93
B) The Waldburger Court Held That CERCLA Section 9658 Does
Not Preempt State Statutes of Repose
Although federal courts recognize that the NCUA, FHFA, and
FDIC Extender statutes are virtually identical, the courts divide on
whether the Waldburger statutory analysis applies to the Extender
statute at all.
In Waldburger, the Supreme Court addressed whether CERCLA
section 9658 preempted state statutes of repose. 94 In that case, a
group of North Carolina homeowners discovered their well water
had high traces of chemicals, which they believed were pollutants
left by electronics manufacturer CTS Corporation. CTS Corpora-
tion had sold the plant-i.e. committed its last "culpable act"-in
the late 1980s, which meant that North Carolina's 10-year statute
of repose had already passed long before Peter Waldburger pur-
chased the property, let alone discovered the harm.95 Waldburger
and his co-plaintiffs argued that CERCLA's remedial nature meant
that North Carolina's 10-year rule did not apply, that is, that they
should still be entitled to sue CTS to recover damages for the envi-
ronmental cleanup.96 The Court granted certiorari to resolve a wid-
ening circuit split on the question of whether CERCLA preempts
state statutes of repose.97
92. But see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93. See Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1203; Herron, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
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The Court's statutory analysis examined the text itself, as well
as the legislative history, the purpose of the statute, and the differ-
ing aims of statutes of limitations versus statutes of repose.98 In
holding that CERCLA's statutory text did not preempt North Car-
olina's 10-year statute of repose, the Court's decision rested on the
fact that "Congressional intent is discerned primarily from the stat-
utory text;" given that the text did not mention statutes of repose,
and further noting the substantial differences in their operation
compared with a statute of limitations, the Court held that to find
preemption would also require it to find "that statutes of repose ...
cease to serve any real function."99 Ultimately, the Court was not
willing to negate state legislative decisions in the face of Congres-
sional silence.
As a result of this holding, CTS Corporation, which allegedly pol-
luted much of the land on which the homeowners now lived and
drew their groundwater, saw the case dismissed. In her dissent,
Justice Ginsberg logically reasoned that the court had eviscerated
any objective that Congress may have intended, as Congress' sole
purpose in enacting the statute had been to allow people like the
Waldburgers to recover damages for pollution discovered many
years later.100 Upon deciding Waldburger, the Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded, for further consideration, a prior Tenth Cir-
cuit case, Nomura I, which had previously held that the Federal
Extender statute preempted state statutes of repose.101
C) The Tenth Circuit Explains that the Extender Statute is Not
Like CERCLA
On reconsideration, the Nomura II court affirmed its original
holding and reinstated its original opinion that the Extender Stat-
ute trumps state statutes of repose.102 This surprising decision
drove a wedge deeper into an already wide split amongst the federal
district courts. Oddly, when deciding whether the Extender statute
preempted state statutes of repose, the courts had split not along
circuit or even district lines, but instead along federal agency
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2185, 2189.
100. See 134 S. Ct. at 2191.
101. See Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 727 F.3d 1246,
1273 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Nomura 1') cert. granted, judgment vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2818 (2014).
Nomura I held that the Federal Extender Statute preempted state statutes of repose.
102. See Nomura II, 764 F.3d 1199.
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lines. 103 Those courts evaluating the FDIC claims came to consist-
ently hold that the Extender statute did not preempt statutes of
repose, while the courts evaluating the exact same language with
regard to the NCUA and FHFA claims consistently arrived at the
opposite conclusion.10 4
In a twist of irony, it could be said that the reason for the odd
district court split also comes down to timing. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas issued its holding
on the FDIC extender statute on August 18th, 2014-a single day
before the Tenth Circuit issued Nomura .o105 While the Western
District of Texas is of course not bound by decisions from the Tenth
Circuit, the contemporaneous consideration of the cases meant that
neither court had the benefit of the other's decision to rely upon
when ruling on these very similar issues. The Western District of
Texas held the exact opposite with regard to the FDIC Extender
Statute than the Tenth Circuit did with regard to the NCUA Ex-
tender Statute. While Nomura was forced to stay and defend in the
Tenth Circuit, Merrill Lynch and Goldman's cases in the Western
District of Texas were dismissed with prejudice.1 0 6 The Fifth Cir-
cuit's reversal and remand of the FDIC cases back to the Western
District of Texas has now aligned the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth
Circuit on this issue, although a request for certiorari is pending.107
This drama played out again within in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York a mere ten days later,
when Judge Cote sided with the Nomura H1 court in holding that
the FHFA Extender statute also preempts state statutes of re-
pose.10 8 The following Tuesday, Judge Stanton of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York sided with the Western District of Texas in hold-
ing that the FDIC Extender statute does not preempt.109 The liti-
gants in Judge Cote's courtroom (HSBC North America Holdings,
Inc.) were forced to stay and defend, while the litigants in Judge
Stanton's courtroom (Chase Mortgage Finance Corporation) went
home.110
The different stances these courts take generally echo the argu-
ments of the Waldburger majority and dissent. In comparing the
103. See cases cited supra notes 14, 15.
104. See cases cited supra notes 14, 15.
105. See cases cited supra notes 14, 15.
106. Compare Nomura II, 764 F.3d 1199 with Merrill Lynch, 2014 WL 4161561 and with
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 2014 WL 4161567.
107. See cases cited supra notes 14, 15 and accompanying text.
108. See HSBC, 2014 WL 4276420.
109. See Chase, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 579.
110. See cases cited supra notes 10809 and accompanying text.
262 Vol. 54
No Rest for the Weary
Extender statute to CERCLA section 9658, the district courts hear-
ing the FDIC claims apply the Waldburger majority analysis and
arrive at the Waldburger majority result. These courts evaluate the
text of the statute and examine the legislative history and statutory
purpose. In doing so, these courts rely on the subtle yet substantial
differences between a statute of limitations and repose to ulti-
mately conclude that Congress demonstrated no legislative intent
to preempt the states' laws regarding repose.'
In contrasting the Extender statute from CERCLA section 9658,
the courts hearing NCUA and FHFA claims distinguish Wald-
burger and arrive at the opposite result.112 Like Justice Ginsburg's
dissent, these courts reason that Congress wrote a remedial statute
for the purpose of protecting the public from harms that may not
come to light for many years, and thus the Extender statute must
preempt any and all shorter state timeframes.113 In stressing func-
tion over form, these courts explain that the terms-statute of lim-
itations, statute of repose-do not matter as much as the purpose
for which the Extender statute was enacted.1 1 4 These courts hold
that the Extender statute's "universal time frame" preempts state
law, regardless of what terms the state legislature may have used
to limit the timeframe in which its citizens can be sued.115
D) The Supreme Court Has Historically Limited FIRREA to its
Express Provisions
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of the scope of
the FDIC's preemptive authority under FIRREA before. In O'Mel-
veny & Myers, the Court explained that there are three questions
to ask when determining whether federal or state law controls: (1)
whether the text of the federal statute is explicit on the subject; (2)
whether the "federal statutory regulation . . . is comprehensive and
detailed," in which case the court assumes that "matters left un-
addressed" are to be decided under state law; and (3) whether the
FDIC is suing in its capacity as a receiver, as opposed to suing in
111. See cases cited supra note 14 and accompanying text.
112. See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text.
113. See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., HSBC, 2014 WL 4276420 at *3, citing Nomura II ("By establishing all-pur-
pose time limits for any actions [the agency] may wish to pursue, the Extender Statute dis-
places all preexisting limits on the time to bring suit, whatever they are called...").
115. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1203; see also NCUAv. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 13CV6705
DLC, 2014 WL 5017822 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (explaining that the doctrine of obstacle




its capacity as a government entity.11 6 In addition, the Court re-
emphasized the tenet set forth in Erie Railroad Company v. Tomp-
kins: "[t]here is no federal common law."1 1
Invoking the doctrine of "inclusio unius, exclusion alterius," Jus-
tice Scalia explained that FIRREA is limited by its explicit terms.11 8
To emphasize this fact, Justice Scalia pointed to the Extender Stat-
ute itself as an example of how FIRREA contains very specific rules
regarding both claims and defenses. Where the FDIC is acting in
its capacity as a receiver, it is not exerting the claims of the federal
government, but is merely exerting those rights that the failed bank
had as of the date it was taken into receivership.119 Although the
Court acknowledged in dicta that "deplet[ion] of the deposit insur-
ance fund" could potentially be considered a significant federal pol-
icy interest, the Court held that-at the time-the FDIC had set no
limits on the reserve fund.120 Therefore, the Court held that the
FDIC as receiver had no "specific, concrete federal policy or interest
that [was] compromised by [state] law." 1 2 1 Accordingly, in a receiv-
ership situation, "any defense good against the original party is
good against the receiver."122
In viewing the Federal Extender statute through the lens of both
Waldburger and O'Melveny & Myers, three points become clear:
first, the text of the Federal Extender statute is limited only to that
text explicitly stated on its face; second, the Supreme Court does
not appear willing to expand the power of the federal agencies be-
yond that specifically granted by Congress; and third, the Supreme
Court has shown its willingness to dismiss claims against poten-
tially culpable parties at the expense of injured plaintiffs, rather
than legislate from the bench.12 3
116. 114 S. Ct. at 2054.
117. Id. at 83 (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
118. Id. at 86.
119. See id. at 85 ("...the FDIC is not the United States, and even if it were we would be
begging the question to assume that it was asserting its own rights rather than, as receiver,
the rights of [the failed bank.]").
120. 114 S. Ct. at 2055. The Dodd Frank Act has now set the limits on the Reserve Fund.
The question of whether this would alter the modern day analysis is dubious, at best, how-
ever, because the section where Justice Scalia notes the potential validity of the argument is
written in another section of the case drafted on the alternative assumption that FIRREA
does not apply. For information on the new limits required by the Dodd Frank Act, see FDIC:
Deposit Insurance Fund Management (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insur-
ance/fund.html.
121. 114 S. Ct. at 2055.
122. Id. at 2054.
123. See generally O'Melveny & Myers, 114 S. Ct. 2048; Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175.
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Regardless of the fact that the courts interpreting the NCUA and
FHFA statutes attempt to distinguish the text of the Extender stat-
ute from CERCLA section 9658, these courts cannot escape the
large shadow Waldburger casts. The Court's generally dim attitude
toward expanding the term "statute of limitation" to include "stat-
ute of repose" is equally applicable to the Extender statute as it was
to CERCLA section 9658.124 In fact, it could be argued that the case
for finding preemption was even stronger in Waldburger, where leg-
islative history acknowledged that state statutes of repose posed
the same problem with discovery of harm as did the statutes of lim-
itations. Still, the Court in Waldburger efused to expand its inter-
pretation to include the statute of repose.
Although the Nomura II court explained that Congress' failure to
mention statutes of repose in FIRREA's legislative history actually
supports its conclusion that the Extender statute is a "universal
timeframe," it is evident that the courts are splitting hairs.12 5 In
describing why the Extender statute preempts all potentially con-
flicting state time limits, the court reasoned that CERCLA section
9658 merely creates specific exceptions to state rules, while the Ex-
tender statute's different structure acts as a blanket that "displaces
all preexisting limits on the time to bring suit, whatever they are
called."126 The problem with this argument is that it overlooks the
reasoning in O'Melveny & Myers, in which the Court held that
FIRREA cannot be "supplemented or modified by federal common
law"; to do so "is not to 'supplement' this scheme, but to alter it." 127
The courts holding that the NCUA and FHFA Extender statute are
"universal timeframes" therefore take an expansive approach to a
statute that the Supreme Court has already cautioned is to be read
narrowly. In conjunction with the Court's decision in Waldburger,
that explicit preemption of a statute of limitations is not enough to
also preempt a statute of repose, this is a surprising stance.
Perhaps another reason these courts come down on this side of
the fence is the result of an unspoken policy issue. That is, it simply
feels wrong to allow Wall Street to escape unscathed, while the mer-
its of the cases remain unaddressed. Should the state statutes of
repose be permitted to control, then the search for a culpable party
124. See generally Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175.
125. See Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1208. In distinguishing the Extender Statute from
CERCLA, the Court purposefully points out that "[t]he Extender statute creates 'the appli-
cable statute of limitations' for 'any action brought by' NCUA on behalf of a failed credit
union." It would seem as though by simply placing the emphasis on the word "limitations"
rather than "the," naysayers could find support for arriving at the opposite result. Id.
126. 764 F.3d at 1208.
127. 114 S. Ct. at 2054.
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ends prematurely, with little to no answers. Unfortunately for the
courts interpreting the NCUA and FHFA extender statute, this was
the Waldburger dissenting argument, not the majority.128 Although
Justice Ginsberg's dissent argued "that 'certain State statutes de-
prive plaintiffs of their day in court' ... [by] thwart[ing]" 1 2 9 Con-
gress's remedial intent, the majority held that "almost every statute
might be described as remedial in the sense that all statutes are
designed to remedy some problem."130
In conclusion, the Waldburger court explained that "[t]he case for
federal preemption is particularly weak where Congress has indi-
cated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal
interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and
to tolerate whatever tension there is between them."1 3 1 Because the
Court has already decreed that FIRREA-like CERCLA-must
yield to state law when the federal statute is silent on the subject,
so too must the Extender Statute yield to a state statute of repose.
Until Congress speaks on the topic of state statutes of repose, it is
unlikely the Supreme Court will find preemption in its silence.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Congress should take immediate action to review
the text of the Federal Extender statute and lend clarity as to its
intentions. Lacking any action from Congress, the federal courts-
courts of limited jurisdiction-cannot simply create a federal com-
mon law to read a "universal time limit" into a statute that refers
solely to a statute of limitations.132 Because FIRREA (and, by im-
plication HERA and FCUA) necessarily rely on state law provisions
to supplement their text, the Extender statute only preempts the
state statute of repose if Congress explicitly states that it does.133
Congress has so far failed to do so, and accordingly, the federal
128. See Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175.
129. 134 S. Ct. 2191.
130. Id. at 2185. Compare id. at 2188 (explaining that the "level of generality at which
[CERCLA's] purpose is framed affects the judgment whether a specific reading will further
or hinder that purpose." Where a statute "does not provide a general cause of action for all
harm...[and] leaves untouched States' judgments about causes of action, the scope of liability,
the duration of the period provided by statutes of limitations, burdens of proof, rules of evi-
dence, and other important rules governing civil actions," the statute is not a "complete re-
medial framework."); with O'Melveny & Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2054 (explaining FDIC's argu-
ment that FIRREA generally gives it "a nonexclusive grant of rights to the FDIC receiver,
which can be supplemented or modified by federal common law ... is demolished by those
provisions of FIRREA which specifically create special federal rules of decisions regarding
claims by, and defenses against, the FDIC as receiver.").
131. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. at 2188.
132. See supra note 130.
133. See supra note 130.
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courts-like the Supreme Court in Waldburger-must construe the
Extender Statute merely as a statute of limitations, and not repose.
Regardless of whether the result feels right or not, this standard
interpretation of the Extender Statute is necessary to provide uni-
formity in the law and avoid piecemeal litigation. It's necessary to
uphold notions of comity, and-ultimately-puts the onus to legis-
late on Congress, upon whom the task of lawmaking properly rests.

